The U.S. and China are the world's largest and second largest CO 2 emitters, respectively, and to what extent the U.S. and China get involved in combating global climate change is extremely important both for lowering compliance costs of climate mitigation and adaptation and for moving international climate negotiations forward. While it is unavoidable that China will take on commitments at some specific point of time in the future, this paper has argued that the proposal for joint accession by the U.S. and China is not a way forward. For various reasons, such a proposal is in the U.S. interest, but is not in the interest of China. Given the U.S. political reality and institutional settings on the one hand and China's over-riding concern about economic growth and poverty reduction on the other, the two countries are unlikely to take on emissions caps under an international regime, at least for the time being. Therefore, we need to explore the area where cooperation between the two countries to address climate change seems best. The research, development and deployment of clean technology is the area that is in the best interests of the two countries. The U.S. has adopted a technology-oriented approach to climate issues, and has launched the four multilateral initiatives on technology cooperation and the Asia Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate (APP).
Introduction
For quite some time, the U.S. and China have pointed at the other as the culprit who is blocking the climate negotiation process. This leads to a dilemma. On the one hand, the U.S. rejects the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts major developing countries like China, Mexico and India, and thus it is conceivable that the U.S. would not re-join the international climate regime without more specific commitments than those general commitments from major developing countries. On the other hand, the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol will substantially reduce incentives to invest in clean development mechanism (CDM) projects that imply reduced financial flows channelled to developing countries through CDM. Given that China is widely regarded as the dominant host country of the CDM projects (Zhang, 2000a and 2004) , the significant decrease in demand for permits as a result of the world's largest single buyer remaining outside the international market of tradable permits would lower the gain of China substantially. Against this background, some American analysts (e.g., Stewart and Wiener, 2003) suggest joint accession by the U.S. and China. This proposal does have the merit of enhancing environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol and helping stabilize the price of permits on the international market. It is certainly in the interest of the U.S. because the participation of China would substantially reduce the U.S. compliance costs and increase the environmental effectiveness. The question then is whether the joint accession proposal is in the interest of China.
In this paper, we will look at this issue from the following perspectives: a) how First, although broad discussions and cooperation in the field of climate change continue between China and the U.S., it is doubtful that China would be willing to discuss joint cap-and-trade arrangements with the U.S. For historical reasons, China attributes great importance to maintaining unity of the Group of 77, and engaging in discussions on joint cap-and-trade arrangements with the U.S. may well be perceived as threatening the solidarity of that Group. Developing countries, including China, insist that industrialised countries should demonstrate taking the lead in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions before developing countries even consider taking on such commitments.
With the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and a very low scale of overall emissions reductions in the industrialised countries during the first commitment period (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) Second, the legitimacy of the U.S. insistence that it will re-join the Kyoto Protocol or a follow-up regime only if major developing countries join as well is questionable. Given that the U.S. is the world's largest economy and emitter of greenhouse gases, it has both the responsibility for the global climate problem and the ability to contribute to solving it. To have a significant long-term effect on global greenhouse gas emissions, a global climate regime eventually must include substantial participation by developing countries. But the U.S. conditioning its commitments on developing countries' commitments is unlikely to induce participation by developing countries. In my view, unless the U.S. has made credible commitments itself, it does not have the moral right to persuade developing countries to take meaningful abatement actions. International climate negotiations prior to the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol suggest that U.S. taking on the commitments first and then jawboning developing countries including China had some impact on the position of developing countries and the timing of their commitments (Zhang, 2000b) . 2 2 Prior to Kyoto, developing counties' demand for the U.S. to demonstrate the leadership and the EU proposal for a 15% cut in emissions of a basket of three greenhouse gases below 1990 levels by 2010 put collective pressure on the U.S., which leads the world in greenhouse gas emissions. At Kyoto, the U.S. had made legally binding commitments. The Kyoto target is seen as not enough but yet not unreasonable given that the U.S. economy would not be disrupted unreasonably. After Kyoto, the ball was kicked into China's court. The U.S. had made it clear that bringing key developing countries, including China, on board had been and would continue to be its focus of international climate change negotiations. According to some U.S. Senators, it will be countries like China, India and Mexico that will decide whether the U.S. will ratify the Kyoto Protocol. It is therefore conceivable that the pressure will mount for China to make some kind of commitments at the negotiations subsequent to Buenos Aires. The world's media will undoubtedly bring attention to China's non-participation, which will be seen as holding up the ratification of the Protocol by the U.S. Senate and possibly even be blamed for "blowing up" subsequent negotiations aimed at dealing with developing countries' commitments. The U.S. commitments at Kyoto and diplomatic and public pressure on China had put China in a very uncomfortable position. It looked like China would be Third, developing countries have been sensitive to commitment issues, and the U.S. position at the eight Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in New Delhi makes the launching of a dialogue on broadening future commitments difficult, not to mention to ask developing countries to take on commitments. The U.S. strikingly reversed the position on the commitments of developing countries in New Delhi in comparison with the position at Kyoto. At Kyoto, the U.S. called for stronger action by developing countries, but in New Delhi declared such discussion about developing country's commitments premature. This would have long-term implications because developing countries would defend their position using this argument in the future when being asked to take on commitments. This certainly complicates initiating discussions on joint accession by the U.S. and China.
Fourth, the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol does nothing but erode trust and reinforce the stalemate between the North and the South, and it is difficult to imagine that China and India would assume emissions targets before the U.S. re-entry into Kyoto or a follow-up regime. Doing so would be perceived as rewarding the U.S. for disregarding the Protocol. 
Technology Cooperation between the U.S. and China
In the previous section, we argue that joint accession by the U.S. and China is not a way forward. However, this by no means prevents the two countries from cooperating in their pressured to take on commitments at much earlier date than what China wished (Zhang, 2000b) . This situation has changed once the U.S. withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol. 3 The U.S. uses its re-entry of the Kyoto regime as a leverage to take on less stringent targets in the later commitment periods. McCain said that the pact "amounts to nothing more than a nice little public-relations ploy…It has almost no meaning. They aren't even committing money to the effort, much less enacting rules to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions" (quoted in Little (2005)). The environmental groups were fairly united, criticizing that the pact is nothing but a repackage of existing technology partnerships and short on sustance.
Then, in January 2006, the six partner countries met at Sydney for their inaugural ministerial meeting to flesh out the APP. They adopted a Chapter aimed to implement the vision of pursuing development and poverty eradication, and jointly established eight public-private sector task forces (covering cleaner use of fossil energy, renewable energy and distributed generation, power generation and transmission, steel, aluminium, cement, coal mining, and buildings and appliances) and defined their work plans. 9 It becomes also clear that the APP focuses on technological development, deployment and transfer. These fleshes help us to have a better understanding of the APP, although it is still very difficult to infer its full effectiveness at this stage.
9 See the APP web site at: http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org.
The partnership brings together -for the first time -the six key developing and developed countries in the region to address the challenges of air pollution, energy security and climate change in a way that is designed to promote economic development and reduce poverty. The six countries represent almost half of world GDP, energy consumption, greenhouse gas emissions and population. Given the scale of this group, theoretically speaking, the APP has the potential to make a significant impact. The U.S.
led this initiative. On the U.S. side, the President Bush has requested US$ 52 million in the upcoming FY2007 budget to support the efforts of the APP.
Based on the current information available, my adjument is that the APP can contribute the overall efforts, but whether it is going to deliver any substantial outcomes as Australian and the U.S. governments claim remains to be seen. Three reasons for my cautiousness. First, the partnership does not incorporate legally binding commitments or targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Rather, it will rely on voluntargy measures to encourage the take-up of greenhouse gas reducing investments.This has raised serious concern about its effectiveness. Past experience shows that voluntary measures can be helpful, but not enough to ensure that new technologies will roll out at the pace and on the scale that we need. The modeling work by the ABARE (2006) indicates that, even with favorable assumptions on the timing and scope of adopting advanced technologies, global greenhouse gas emissions are expected to rise from 8 gigatons of carbon equivalent in 2001 to over 17 gigatons in 2050 as a result of the APP activities (see Figure 1) . 10 This means that global emissions would more than double with the APP, although they would rise to over 22 gigatons in 2050 in the absence of the APP. This is far from the required greenhouse gas reductions in the order of 60-80% by the middle of this century to avoid dangerous climate-induced changes.
Figure 1 Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 2050 under Various Scenarios
Partnership technology scenario refers to increased energy efficiency and uptakes of advanced energy technologies in key sectors;
agreed, is only intended as a first step, and includes specific reference to a second commitment period to follow the first. As exemplified by the Montreal Protocol, the history of international environmental agreements has almost entirely been one of increasing the scope and strength of commitments, and there is no fundamental reason why the future development of the Kyoto Protocol should be any different (Grubb et al., 1999) . Global technology + partnership CCS scenario refers to the diffusion of more energy efficient technologies throughout the world, with the CCS being used only within the partnership countries.
Source: ABARE (2006).
My another concern is the extent to which the APP is going to facilitate the transfers of low emission technologies, once they become available, to developing partners like China and India, beyond that already being achieved through the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms like the clean development mechanism, which encourages the transfers of low or zero emission technologies to developing countries by allowing industrialized countries to meet part of their emission reduction obligations using the emission credits generated through investment in emission abating projects in developing countries. This is very crucial for China and India to deploy these technologies in order to significantly lower their growth rates of greenhouse gas emissions. This is the key criterion to assess the effectiveness of the APP. I believe that expectation for significant transfers of advanced energy technologies in addition to that already occurring under the CDM is the main motive for the two largest developing countries to join in the APP.
11
11 Prodipto Ghosh, Secretary of the India's Ministry of Environment and Forests, was quoted as saying that "we had hoped for much larger foreign direct investment. We are disappointed by the scale of foreign technology under CDM". India is the second largest host of CDM projects (Zhang, 2000a (Zhang, , 2004 (Zhang, and 2006 . Even if the Indian government is disappointed by the scale of technology transfer under the CDM, then prospect for
The question then is whether the two countries are able to get and afford to these technologies. This requires some kind of market incentives, given that most advanced technologies are commercially valuable and held by private companies. It is true that the APP views the private sector as critical to its efforts. But for now at least, I don't see such market incentives there. Without such incentives, governments can do little to ensure the transfers of these technologies to the scale that we need to have a real impact on the emissions of these two countries. As a result, this will undermine the effectiveness of the (2006)). The aforementioned eight sector task forces have developed an initial set of about 100 projects and activities under their corresponding Action Plans, and the Policy and Implementation Committee of the APP endorsed these plans at its meeting in Jeju Island, Korea, October 2006 (APP, 2006 . It is expected that these sector task forces get something in the process of implementing an initial portfolio of these projects and activities. However, given that the APP does not have much money on the table and the past record of limited leverage of public funding, it is not at all clear whether the APP is able to mobilize significant investment from the private sector to bridge the aforementioned large gap.
Concluding Remarks
The U.S. and China are the world's largest and second largest CO 2 emitters, respectively, and to what extent the U.S. and China get involved in combating global climate change is extremely important both for lowering compliance costs of climate mitigation and adaptation and for moving international climate negotiations forward. To get the world's largest emitter back to the international regime, some analysts suggest for joint accession by the U.S. and China. While it is unavoidable that China will take on commitments at some specific point of time in the future, this paper has argued that the U.S. conditioning its commitments on China's commitments is unlikely to induce China's participation. For various reasons, such a proposal for a China-U.S. bilateral regime is in the U.S. interest, but is not in the interest of China.
Political reality and institutional settings in the U.S. indicate that the country will not return to Kyoto anytime soon. Recognizing that, at least for the time being, cooperation under the Kyoto framework seems impossible, other forms of cooperation between the two largest emitters need to be encouraged and explored. The U.S. strongly believes that technology holds the key to solve climate problems, and accordingly has led the four multilateral initiatives in the areas of carbon separation and capture, hydrogen, methane recovery and advanced nuclear energy systems. All of these initiatives emphasize the development and deployment of clean technology, and set out immediate and medium-term actions, including possible flagship projects, to achieve the stated goals.
China has participated in all these U.S.-led initiatives. But its participation is limited to large extent by lack of financial and technical capacity. This will limit the prospects for China to adopt advanced mitigation technologies at an early stage.
Largely inspired by the same basic principle, the U.S. proposed and, together with Australia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea, formed the Asia Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate. While environmental groups view the partnership as a breakaway from Kyoto, the partners describe it as complementary to -and not a substitute for -the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. In my view, the APP can contribute the overall global efforts, by aligning a portfolio of very practical, sector-based actions to increase energy security, reduce air pollution and cut greenhouse gas emissions.
Indeed, integrating energy security, air pollution and climate issues under the APP has been considered a plus. Take China and the U.S. as an example. Cooperation on these broader issues will yield benefits to both countries as well as the whole world. To what extent energy conservation, hydropower, nuclear power and renewable energies are going to play in lowering the overall dominance of coal in China's energy consumption and putting the country on the path further away from fossil fuel reliance in the future is an issue of perennial great concern, not simply for China because this gives rise to unprecedented environmental pollution and health risks in China (Zhang, 2005) , but also for the U.S. because spreading air pollutants from China is reported to go as far away as the U.S. (quoted in Chea (2006)). Moreover, China is already the world's second largest oil importer behind the U.S., importing over 40% of its oil consumption. If clean technologies from the U.S. are transferred and deployed in China, that will reduce its needs for fossil fuels and increase alternative energy sources to meet a larger portion of the nation's energy needs. This will reduce its growing hunger for foreign oil, leave more oil on the market, and thus help to stabilize the oil prices. This will significantly benefit the U.S., because this will reduce the world's largest importer spending on oil and reduce potential conflicts between the two countries in the current and emerging oil fields. 13 In addition, the APP could add some value to the Kyoto process by bringing some key missing players to the Finally, I like to emphasize that the role of the U.S. is of paramount importance to either effective China-U.S. cooperation or global efforts towards climate control. The U.S.
has led several multilateral efforts in this area, but has not taken the lead in global efforts towards combating global climate change. Winston Churchill said that " [you] can always count on the Americans to do the right thing -after exhausting every other alternative.".
In my view, the U.S. leading the world in climate control or setting a good example for China may well be remembered as a case where Americans can do the right thing after exhausting at least some of the alternatives. Only history will tell us whether that will be a case. 13 China's practice of oil diplomacy is widely perceived in Washington as attempts to threaten U.S. security interests because Beijing strikes deals either with the so-called rogue states that Washington has tried to marginalize or in America's backyard which Washington perceives as its turf and within its traditional sphere of influence (Zhang, 2007) .
